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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KARYL I. McKEAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CASE NO. 13954

vs.
THOMAS M. McKEAN,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff-Appellant, Karyl I. McKean, appeals
from the Decree of Divorce entered against her in the Third
Judicial District Court and from the denial of her Motion
to Alter or Amend Judgment, or In The Alternative For A
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New Trial in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin,
Judge, presiding.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court found grounds for divorce pursuant to
Section 30-3-1, U„C.A* (1953), as amended, and entered a
Decree of Divorce against both the Defendant-Respondent
and the Plaintiff-Appellant.

Subsequently the Plaintiff-

Appellant filed a Motion To Alter or Amend Judgment, or
In The Alternative, For A New Trial, which Motion was denied,
except for minor modifications that were made in the Decree.
(TR. 73-74).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the Decree
of Divorce granted Defendant-Respondent and a new trial to
determine an equitable property settlement and sufficient
payment of alimony, child support and attorney's fees.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Plaintiff-Appellant and Defendant-Respondent are
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husband and wife, having been married at Salt Lake City,
State of Utah on April 3, 1948.

(TR. 27) . There are six

children born of the marriage, two of which are dependent
children, living at home:

Scott T. McKean, age 19, born

December 15, 1955 and Sara Liza McKean, age 9, born August
5, 1965 (Trial Trans. 27). The Defendant is presently
employed as Sales Manager for a heavy construction equipment sales firm (Trial Trans. 113).
After 26 years of marriage, Plaintiff filed for divorce
on June 11, 1973 and Defendant answered and counterclaimed
on July 9, 1973. Defendant alleged in his counterclaim
that Plaintiff had treated him cruelly, causing him great
mental suffering and distress (TR. 27).
On November 18, 1974, a Decree of Divorce was entered,
granting both Plaintiff and Defendant a divorce.

Plaintiff

was awarded the care and custody of the minor dependent
children, subject to the reasonable visitation rights of
Defendant (TR. 51). Plaintiff was further awarded:

(1)

the use of the home of the parties, subject to all liens
and taxes; (2) one-half of the equity of said home, which
has been ordered to be sold upon Plaintiff's remarriage, or
upon Plaintiff's removal from said home, or upon the last
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minor child attaining an age of majority; (3) one-half of
all Defendant's future bonuses, if any, less any Federal
and State withholding and FICA deductions; (4) one-half of
the savings of the parties, in the amount of $2,071.50;
(5) one-half of Defendant's 1974 bonus in the amount of
$1,337.00; (6) the 1964 Ford station wagon (subject to use
by the son, Scott) and the 1972 Ford Truck and camper; (7)
automotive tools; (8) some household furniture, personal
effects and clothing; (9) alimony in the amount of $300.00
per month; (10) child support in the amount of $150.00 per
child per month.

Plaintiff was ordered to pay her own

attorney's fees and the BankAmericard obligation.
The Divorce Decree awarded Defendant:

(TR. 51-

(1) one-half

of the equity of the home when sold; (2) one-half of Defendant's future bonuses, if any; (3) one-half of the savings
of the parties, in the amount of $2,071.50; (4) some household furniture and appliances; (5) personal effects, clothing, television set, rifle, workbench, movie camera and
projector; (6) carpentry tools, including bench saw; (7)
retirement fund of $20,615,00; (8) insurance policies with
cash surrender values totaling $4,675.44. (TR. 51-55).
Defendant was found to be earning a net income of
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approximately $1,200.00 per month after Federal and State
tax withholding, FICA Retirement, and Medical Insurance
deductions.

This amount of monthly income did not reflect

any actual or potential bonuses that Defendant would receive.
(Trial Trans. 156).
Plaintiff has suffered a hand and wrist injury which
has resulted in permanent partial disability (Trial Trans.
30).

Plaintiff is unemployed and unskilled, having devoted

her 26 years of marriage to being a wife and a mother. Her
only employment was as a secretary during the first two years
of marriage and as an Avon representative for approximately
three years (Trial Trans. 28). The disability in Plaintiff's hand and wrist interfers with her ability to type
(Trial Trans. 30).

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING OF FACTS
TO SUPPORT A DECREE OF DIVORCE IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Defendant sought and was granted a divorce decree

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pursuant to Section 30-3-1(7) U.C.A. (1953), as amended,
which sets out as one of the grounds for divorce:

"Cruel

treatment of the Plaintiff by the Defendant to the extent
of causing bodily injury or great mental distress to the
Plaintiff."

The Findings of Fact state in paragraph 4 that

[d]uring the marriage the Plaintiff has treated the Defendant cruelly, upsetting him in arguments and fights and
refusing to perform her marriage duties as a wife, which
has caused him to be nervous and upset and distressed."
(TR. 61). Testimony was elicited from the Defendant to
support the allegation that Plaintiff refused to perform
her marriage duties (Trial Trans. 115-116).

Said testimony

was later effectively rebutted by the Plaintiff (Trial
Trans. 165, 170-171).

There was no testimony elicited from

Defendant to show that Plaintiff!s alleged denial of sexual
relations with Defendant caused Defendant any emotional
distress at all or caused Defendant "to be nervous and upset
and distressed," as found by the Court (TR. 61).
There is no testimony or evidence in the record to
support the Findings of Fact that Plaintiff upset Defendant
in arguments and fights. Defendant did testify that "it

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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had been a rather rocky marriage," but such testimony is
vague and does not warrant a finding by the Court that
Plaintiff upset Defendant in arguments and fights causing
him to be nervous and upset (Trial Trans. 115, line 5).
Courts are not authorized to grant divorces except
for particular cause prescribed by law and then only when
grounds or cause for divorce are proved by substantial and
satisfactory evidence.
212 P. 2d 194 (1949).

Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571,
There was neither substantial nor

satisfactory evidence to support Finding No. 4 (TR. 61).
Furthermore, the lower court in its Findings of Fact
3 and 4 found that each party denied sexual relations to
the other party, thus causing great mental distress to each
other.

If, in fact, each party intentionally refused to

have marital relations with the other, then each party was
the cause of his or her own mental distress resulting from
any such denials, and said mental distress cannot possibly
be blamed on the other.

Findings 3 and 4 are in logical

conflict with each other.
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POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT
AWARDED PLAINTIFF.
The trial court awarded Plaintiff the sum of Three
Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month as alimony and One
Hundred Fifty Dollars($150.00) per month per dependent
child.

(TR. 55). Plaintiff was also awarded one-half of

all future bonuses of Defendant subject to deductions for
taxes and social security. (TR. 52). However, Defendant's
bonuses are not guaranteed in amount or payment and are
dependent either upon the discretion of the employer of
Defendant, or upon the Defendant attaining a certain sales
goal in his department (TR. 122-123).

Effectively, all

that Plaintiff can rely on getting is the alimony and child
support mentioned above.
It was found by the Court that Defendant has a net
earning of approximately $1,200.00 per month.

It would

appear that in paying Plaintiff Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00)
per month in alimony and child support, Defendant would
be equally dividing his net income between himself and
Plaintiff.

However, the $600.00 he would net is after
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taxes, social security, retirement and medical insurance,
and would be subject to a tax refund because of the $3,600.00
yearly tax deduction he would have for payment of alimony.
Furthermore, Plaintiff's receipt of $3,600.00 per year in
alimony is before taxes, medical insurance and any savings
for later years, and hence will net her far less in net
income than the gross amount of $3,600.00. Also, the lower
court took into account Defendant's total yearly payment
of Social Security for purposes of determining Defendant's
net pay (Trial Trans. 121-122).

His net pay was used as

a basis for determining the award of alimony and child
support to Plaintiff.

In the Decree, Plaintiff was awarded

one-half of all future bonuses subject to State and Federal withholding tax and social security deductions.

The

social security deduction from his 1974 bonus was shown to
be substantial (Trial Trans. 156), to such an extent that
his social security was paid up by mid-year in 1974 (Trial
Trans. 155). Hence, on the one hand, Defendant was allowed
to deduct his full yearly payment of social security in determining his net take-home pay for purposes of showing the
sum from which alimony and child support payments could be
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made*

On the other hand, Defendant was also allowed a

credit for social security taken out of all future bonuses,
in spite of a showing that a significant amount of his
yearly social security was taken from his bonus rather than
his periodic pay checks throughout the entire year.

In

other words, Defendant received more credit for his social
security than he should have.
The lower court clearly abused its discretion by requiring Plaintiff to maintain herself and her two dependent
children on less than Defendant is awarded to maintain
himself, a single man.
; In Bullen v. Bullen, 71 Utah 63, 262 PU 292 (1928),
The allocation to the wife was held to be inequitable and
unjust in view of property owned by the husband and the
cause was remanded with instructions to modify the decree.
Such is the case in this instance.

POINT III.
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN ITS DIVISION OF THE MARITAL PROPERTY.
An equitable division of the marital property would
be an award of 50% of the jointly owned property to each
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of the parties.

The lower court appears to have followed

this formula in dividing most of the marital property in
this case. However, the lower court failed to award Plaintiff any interest in Defendant's retirement fund, which
had a vested interest of $20,615.00 as of March 31, 1974.
This retirement fund was accumulated over the years of the
marriage and should have been considered as marital property in making a division of the total property of the
parties.

An equitable solution would have been to award

Defendant the entire vested interest in the Retirement
Fund and award Plaintiff something of equivalent value,
such as the one-half of the equity in the home of the parties, which was awarded to Defendant.

This solution would

have also eliminated (1) the necessity for Plaintiff to
leave her home in nine years, when her youngest child
reached the age of majority, and (2) the necessity for her
to seek a new life elsewhere at a substantially and unjustifiably lower standard of living due to the fact that she
would not be able to afford a home such as she is presently
living in because she would receive only one-half of the
equity in the present home at the time of sale.
Furthermore, Defendant was ordered by the Court to
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refrain from spending any income received above and beyond
his salary during the pendency of the divorce action (TR.

•

p. 36). Defendant testified that he spent his Christmas
bonus in violation of the court Order (Trial Trans. 141).
No provision was made in the Decree for the splitting of
that bonus between the parties as was done in the case of
all other funds except the Retirement Fund.
The decree of the lower court was reversed in Stewart
v. Stewart, 66 Utah 366, 242 Pac. 947 (1925), on the ground
that the division of the property as made by the trial
court was "clearly inequitable and unfair."

POINT IV.

.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN ITS FAILURE TO AWARD PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY
FEES.

:

:

The Plaintiff is partially disabled, unemployed and
unskilled, having spent her 26 years of married life as a
housewife and a mother.

In the property settlement, as it

now stands, the only liquid assets awarded to Plaintiff were
a share of the family savings, in the amount of $2,071.50,
and a share of Defendant's 1974 bonus, in the amount of
$1,337.00, which provides Plaintiff with the only security she will
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have against emergency expenses which are an everyday part
of life.
The Utah Supreme Court in Griffiths v. Griffiths, 3
Utah 2d 82, 278 P. 2d 983 (1955) stated that "...where it
appears that the husband is better able to bear the costs
of the divorce, and no gross or immoral conduct has been
proved against the defendant, the wife although the losing
party, should be allowed suit money."

Id. at P. 85.

Furthermore, the Court in Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119
Utah 504, 229 P. 2d 681 (1951) explained that "[t]he reason
for permitting a wife suit money to defend an action for
divorce rests on the ground that the wife normally has no
separate estate from which to pay for bringing or defending the action...Not to allow the wife expenses and counsel
fees would in the majority of cases work an injustice by
denying her the power to enforce any marital rights she
may have."

Id. at pp. 686-687.

In the case at hand, there was no showing of gross or
immoral conduct on the part of the Plaintiff.

The defen-

dant was clearly shown to be the party better able to
bear the costs of the divorce since he was gainfully em-
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ployed at a good paying job and she was unemployed.

Further-

more/ her net liquid "estate" from the divorce was of such
a small size by today's standards that to require the
Plaintiff to pay her own attorney's fees, in the amount of
$796.00/ would be to substantially reduce that already
small estate, and hence to all but eliminate Plaintiff's
security and ability to handle emergency expenses.

POINT V.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT/ OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A
NEW TRIAL.
The various grounds for Plaintiff's Motion To Alter
or Amend Judgment/ or in the Alternative, For a New Trial
are included within the matters heretofore argued in this
Brief and are fully set out in the Trial Record on page
57.

The errors of the trial court were such as to require

a new trial to hear the issues.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the above arguments, the lower court erred:
(1) in granting Defendant a Decree of Divorce; (2) in its
division of the marital property; (3) in its award of
inadequate alimony and child support; (4) in its failure
to award Plaintiff her attorneys fees and; (5) in its
failure to grant Plaintiff a new trial upon her motion.
Hence, Plaintiff should be granted a new trial to determine an equitable solution to these errors.

Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE A. EASTER
Attorney for Appellant
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